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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DANIEL LEE ALLEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990902-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals an order requiring him to pay restitution following his 
convictions for aggravated assault, a second degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103 (1999) and unlawful detention, a Class B Misdemeanor under 76-5-304 (1999) This 
Court has jurisdiction of the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court retain jurisdiction over the probationer to 
enforce restitution when it never entered a signed order 
terminating probation? 
Whether a court has personal jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Dickev. 841 P.2d 1203,1204 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 
853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). A trial court's restitution order will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless the court exceeded the authority prescribed by law or abused its 
discretion. State v. McBride. 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah App.), cert denied. 953 
P.2d 449 (Utah 1997); State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah App. 1993), 
cert, denied. 876 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). "However, this court may find an abuse 
of discretion only if we conclude that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 
1997) (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(ii)(A) (1995) provides as follows: 
If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection 
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as 
defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case 
and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of 
enforcing the payment of the account receivable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1 
On May 6, 1996, while in Kimberly Peterson's home, defendant smothered Ms. 
Peterson with a pillow, choked her with a cord, and prevented her from escaping or using 
the telephone. Two days later, he was charged with one count of aggravated assault, a 
second degree felony, two counts of aggravated kidnaping, first degree felonies, and one 
count of attempted murder, a second degree felony (R. 3-4). 
because the relevant facts and the procedural history of this appeal are 
intertwined, they are set forth in one section of the State's Brief. 
2 
In exchange for dismissing the attempted murder charge and one of the aggravated 
assault charges, defendant pleaded guilty to one count each of aggravated assault, unlawful 
detention, and possession of a controlled substance (R. 15, 20). 
Prior to sentencing, defendant submitted a letter to the trial court (R. 42). In the 
letter, defendant stated, "I will do everything in my physical power to help Kim get the 
counseling she needs.... I realize I deserve to pay for what I did." (id.). On October 7, 
1996, the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 1-15 years in prison on the 
aggravated assault charge, and six months in the Duchesne County jail on the unlawful 
detention and drug charges (R. 47). However, the trial court suspended the sentences and 
placed defendant on supervised probation for 36 months, a term that would expire in 
October 1999 unless the trial court extended it (R. 47). The trial court also ordered 
defendant to "pay total restitution to the victim for any counseling and all costs in 
connection therewith" (R. 48). 
Defendant did not object to the trial court's order of restitution. While on probation, 
defendant paid the bills for Ms. Peterson's counseling as those expenses were incurred (R. 
91-92). 
On September 10, 1998, the Department of Adult Probation and Parole (APP) 
submitted a Progress/Violation Report to the trial court. The report stated that "the 
defendant has complied with our agency and completed all terms of the probation 
agreement as directed" and requested that "the defendant's probation be terminated 
3 
satisfactorily" (APP Progress Report p. 1, Addendum A).2 On October 5, 1998, the trial 
court initialed the report on a line marked "APPROVED AND ORDERED " 
(id. at 2). The trial court did not enter a signed order terminating probation. 
On July 26, 1999, the trial court held a review hearing after defendant requested that 
the court clarify the restitution order (R. 56). Defendant asserted that his probation had 
been terminated and that he had paid all restitution up to the date of that termination. He 
objected to the fact that he had received bills for Ms. Peterson's counseling after the alleged 
termination of his probation (R. 56-57). Because defendant's counsel was not present, the 
trial court continued the matter (R. 57). 
On August 9, 1999, the trial court held a hearing concerning defendant's 
responsibility for restitution (R. 83-119). The prosecutor presented a letter from Dr. 
Schneiman, who reported that Ms. Peterson had developed post traumatic stress disorder 
("PTSD") as a result of defendant's attack (R. 86, unnumbered record: letter from Dr. 
Richard Schneiman).3 Ms. Peterson's PTSD was apparently not diagnosed until she began 
treatment with Dr. Schneiman (R. 87, unnumbered record: letter from Dr. Schneiman). Dr. 
Schneiman reported that Ms. Peterson would require weekly psychotherapy sessions and 
2The progress report is unnumbered in the record on appeal. It appears among 
documents affixed to the inside of the top cover of the pleadings file (the "unnumbered 
record"). 
3By the time Ms. Peterson saw Dr. Schneiman, she had taken the last name of Koch. In 
the record, she is referred to as Ms. Koch. 
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monthly medical visits to monitor her medication. At the time of the hearing, Ms. Peterson 
had incurred charges of $708 for counseling to treat her PTSD. (R. 90). 
Defense counsel maintained that the trial court had released defendant from 
probation and that the court did not have jurisdiction to impose restitution (See R. 92). The 









Your Honor, I don't think there was ever a hearing on 
this. I think AP&P just figured he was doing good. 
They didn't need to supervise him. 
I don't think — I don't think there's an order in the file 
actually terminating probation. 
I believe there is, but it's just one of those — 
It's a minute entry, an approval. 
Things approving — 
Nobody ever prepared an order? 
Right. Just the AP&P thing they send in. 
The standard procedure would be that we give notice to 
defense counsel and we sign a formal order terminating 
and we decide whether it's satisfactory or unsatisfactory. 
All I ever did is authorize them to do that and they never 
did it. That's what the record would show. 
What I'd like to do is put a limitation on this and/or 
provide for the defendant to pay for an independent 
medical evaluation because there's need to be a 
balancing here some way. I'm not going to have him 
pay for psychiatric care the rest of his life, obviously. 
But I think, too, this victim need to have some help with 
these bills and I think her distress is very real. That's 
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where I am at this point. I can either say he has to pay 
the six hundred and the ongoing for a year, or if he 
want's to pay for an independent medical to try and save 
some money, I'll give you a hearing on it. 
Defense counsel: Okay. 
(R. 92-93). Although the trial court offered defendant the opportunity to attempt to 
mitigate his restitution obligation by obtaining an independent evaluation of Ms. Peterson's 
condition, the record does not indicate that defendant took advantage of that opportunity. 
At a subsequent hearing on September 20, 1999, the trial court reiterated that the 
initialed progress report did not terminate defendant's probation: "As I recall the probation 
term was winding down, AP&P recommended termination, I initialed that, and never 
received an order I often approve those, but I anticipate an order — a formal order 
terminating satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily as a follow up and that never came" (R. 99, 
101). 
On October 18, 1999, defense counsel filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial 
court's oral finding that it had jurisdiction (R. 72). On November 19, 1999, the trial court 
entered a signed order holding that the court had jurisdiction over defendant's restitution 
obligation (R. 80). The trial court ordered that 
The defendant shall be responsible for restitution for all doctor and 
medical bills for the victim through October, 2000. The estimated amount of 
such restitution is $6,000. This Order may be modified if the doctors 
determine the victim will need additional treatment past October 2000. The 
State shall request another hearing to determine additional restitution if it is 
determined the victim will require additional treatment. 
6 
(14). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court terminated his probation when the court 
initialed the Adult Probation and Parole Progress/Violation Report ("the AP&P progress 
report"). Therefore, he asserts, the court had no jurisdiction to order him to pay additional 
restitution. Contrary to defendant's contentions, a form document bearing the judge's 
initials but not signed by the judge does not constitute an order. As the trial court 
explained, the form was intended to have no such legal effect, and the court's initials 
merely indicated to AP&P that the court had reviewed the recommendation and 
preliminarily approved the termination of probation. 
However, even if defendant's probation had been terminated, under this Court's 
precedent, the trial court retained jurisdiction over defendant's restitution obligation 
independent of defendant's probation status. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UNSIGNED, INITIALED PROGRESS REPORT DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE AN ORDER TERMINATING DEFENDANT'S 
PROBATION; FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD 
JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE RESTITUTION REGARDLESS 
OF DEFENDANT'S PROBATIONARY STATUS 
Defendant maintains that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine his 
ongoing restitution obligation because he was no longer on probation. Since defendant's 
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probation was not due to expire by its terms until October 1999 and the trial court 
commenced its post-sentencing inquiry into defendant's restitution obligation in July 1999, 
defendant contends that the AP&P report initialed by the trial court terminated his 
probation. However, Utah's court rules and case law do not support his claim. 
A. The Initialed AP&P Progress Report Did Not End Defendant's Probation, 
Utah's court rules indicate that judgments must be signed by the trial court to have 
legal effect. Rule 58A(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "all judgments shall 
be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk." Rule 4-403, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, states that while certain court documents not relevant to this case may be 
issued by the court clerk's use of a judge's signature stamp, "[a]ll other documents 
requiring the judge's or commissioner's signature shall be personally signed by the judge or 
commissioner." Utah Code Jud. Admin. 4-403(3). A "signature" has been defined as "the 
name of one as written by oneself." Webster's II New College Dictionary 1027 (1995). 
Since initials do not constitute a person's full name, the clear implication of the court rules 
cited is that orders affecting the rights of parties must bear the judge's full signature to have 
legal effect. 
Case law from other jurisdictions explicitly provides that a judge's initials do not 
constitute the judge's signature. See Manning v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 
876 P.2d 667,670 (Okla. 1994) (initialed record entry cannot constitute a judgment); 
Martin v. Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Oklahoma Citv. Okla.. 839 P.2d 179, 179-80 
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(Okla. 1992) (minute entry bearing trial court's initials did not commence time for appeal). 
See also 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 91 (1994) ("Where the signature of the judge is 
necessary to a judgment, a signature by initials only is insufficient."). Cf South Salt Lake 
v. Burton. 718 P.2d 405, 406 (Utah 1986) (an unsigned minute entry is not enforceable); 
State v. Jimenez. 938 P.2d 264, 264 (Utah 1997) (unsigned minute entry is not a final 
judgment for purposes of an appeal); State v. Rawlings. 829 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah App. 
1992) (same). 
The AP&P progress report was plainly not designed or intended to have legal effect 
on the rights and expectations of the parties. The document does not bear a court caption; 
instead, it is titled as a progress report. By its terms, the document's purpose is to inform 
the court of a defendant's progress while on probation. Furthermore, the trial court stated 
that the progress report was not intended to conclude defendant's probation. As the court 
explained, its standard procedure for terminating probation entailed receipt of the progress 
report, followed by notice to defense counsel and preparation and signing of a formal order 
(R. 93, 101). The court's initials on the report merely served to inform Adult Probation and 
Parole that the court had seen and approved the recommendation and authorized the agency 
to prepare a termination order for the court's signature (id). The report did not end the 
probation termination process, but, instead, triggered it. 
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In short, defendant's probation was not terminated by the trial court's initialing of 
the probation progress report. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine 
defendant's remaining restitution obligation. 
B. Even If the Initialed AP&P Progress Report Had Terminated Defendant's 
Probation, the Trial Court Retained Independent Jurisdiction Over 
Defendant's Restitution Obligation, 
"When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim of 
the offense which defendant has been convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) 
(1995). The trial court's obligation to order restitution is nondiscretionary. State v. Stirba. 
972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah App. 1998). Even after probation has terminated, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii) (1995) provided that; "the court may retain jurisdiction of the case 
and continue defendant on bench probation or place defendant on bench probation for the 
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of... restitution." 
This Court analyzed the applicable statutes in State v. Dickev. 841 P.2d 1203, 1205 
(Utah App. 1992) cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Dickey sought to avoid paying 
restitution after his probation had ended by arguing the trial court could not enforce unpaid 
restitution except as a condition of probation, and that the court's jurisdiction over his 
probation obligation ended with the termination of probation. Id. at 1204. Rejecting 
Dickey's argument, the Court observed that under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201, restitution 
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is a "separate and independent component" of the judgment and sentence, and that 
restitution can also be imposed as part of probation under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1. Id. at 
1207, see also State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 21, ^  6, 12-13 . Grounding its decision in 
the plain language of the restitution statutes, this Court observed that "Utah statutes 
[accord] restitution separate legal effect that parallels] probation in sentencing and 
judgments." Id. at 1205. The Court noted that the "statutory language expressly 
establishes that regardless of whether restitution is made a condition of probation, it has 
independent integrity and legal effect." Id at 1207; see also Nones at ^  ("The discretionary 
nature of the power conferred by section 77-18-1 (8)(a)(ii) [codified the time relevant to this 
appeal at section 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)]... suggests that continuing probation is only one of 
the ways a trial court may enforce restitution"). The Court concluded that even though the 
trial court's jurisdiction over Dickey's probation had ended, id at 1205, the "trial court's 
jurisdiction over defendant to collect restitution continued independent of its authority to 
monito3r his compliance with probation conditions." Id. at 1209, see also Nones at If 16 
("the trial court, though it did not extend Nones' probation, retained jurisdiction over her 
for the collection of restitution"). 
Dickey and Nones control this case. Defendant attempts to distinguish this case 
from Dickey, arguing here, unlike in Dickey, there was "no recorded judgment or lien 
against [defendant] that would continue in force after the expiration of the successful 
termination of his probation." Appellant's Brief at 9. However, that distinction does not 
11 
render Dickey's holding inapplicable to this case. Here, as in Dickey and Nones, 
defendant's restitution obligation was not satisfied. The terms of the trial court's 
restitution order required defendant to pay "total restitution to the victim for any counseling 
and all costs in connection therewith." Although the terms of the order made it clear to 
defendant that his obligation would be ongoing, defendant did not object to the order or 
request a hearing under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e), which provides that "[i]f the 
defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall 
at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue."4 Utah's 
restitution statutes "expressly provide for [a] trial court's jurisdiction over [a] defendant 
until payment completion." Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1205 (emphasis added). Since the trial 
court had continuing jurisdiction over defendant's probation obligation, and Ms. Peterson 
continued to require counseling to help her overcome PTSD caused by defendant's attack, 
defendant's restitution obligation had not ended. Therefore, the trial court properly ordered 
defendant to pay additional restitution.5 
4Not only did defendant not object to the trial court's restitution order, he invited it. 
In his letter to the trial court, defendant pledged to "do everything in my physical power 
to help Kim get the counseling she needs" (R. 42). 
5Although defendant now complains that the original restitution order entered at 
his sentencing "basically allows or requires a victim to claim restitution against the 
Defendant indefinitely," Appellant's Brief at 11, defendant did not object to the 
restitution order. And, although defendant claims that the restitution order "is clearly in 
opposition to the powers and guidelines given to the District Court for sentencing," he 
does not analyze the relevant statutes to explain why his contention on this point is 
correct. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a) requires that a party to an appeal must 
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Defendant asserts that the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction to enforce his ongoing 
restitution obligation places him in a "perpetual state of limbo." Appellant's Brief at 10. 
However, the court commenced its inquiry into defendant's continuing restitution 
obligation before defendant's 36-month probation had terminated. The inquiry concerned 
defendant's ongoing obligation to pay for "any counseling and all costs in connection 
therewith," an obligation to which defendant knew he was subject (R. 80). Furthermore, 
the record shows that the court was conscious of defendant's concern that his obligation 
would continue indefinitely (R. 91, 93, 101). Accordingly, the court's remedy was 
appropriately limited in scope. While the court recognized defendant's legitimate interest 
in ultimately seeing an end to his restitution obligation, the court balanced that interest 
against Ms. Peterson's need for treatment for a condition that was not predictable at the 
provide an argument containing the "contentions and reasons of the [party] with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the 
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
"Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v. 
Brvant. 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998). 
In fact, the trial court's imposition of restitution at sentencing was an appropriate 
exercise of the court's discretion. Because the order required defendant to pay for Ms. 
Peterson's counseling on an ongoing basis, defendant was assured that his payments were 
applied only for that purpose, and were therefore truly remedial. See Monson v. Carver. 
928 P.2d 1017, 1027 (Utah 1996) ("restitution is not a 'punishment' but a civil penalty 
whose purpose is entirely remedial," intended "to compensate victims for the harm 
caused by a defendant and . . . to spare victims the time, expense and emotional 
difficulties of separate civil litigation to recover their damages from the defendant"). The 
trial court also appropriately exercised jurisdiction in the court's subsequent restitution 
order. Since Ms. Peterson required additional counseling for an unanticipated disorder 
that she suffered as a result of defendant's conduct, under the remedial focus of Monson, 
the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay additional restitution. 
13 
time sentence was imposed (R. 93). The court offered defendant the opportunity to obtain 
an independent assessment of Ms. Peterson's PTSD to attempt to reduce his payment 
obligation, but no separate evaluation was apparently performed. Thus, the court awarded 
Ms. Peterson the amount Dr. Schneiman estimated her therapy would cost. Under these 
circumstances, the trial court's order did not place defendant in a perpetual state of limbo. 
Defendant relies on State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995), and State v. 
Green. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), for the proposition that when probation terminates, a trial 
court loses the power to assert jurisdiction over a defendant for the purposes of either 
extending or revoking probation. Appellant's Brief at 8, 10. Those cases have no 
application here because, unlike Dickev and Nones, they do not address a trial court's 
independent jurisdiction to enforce a defendant's restitution obligation. 
In sum, in accordance with Dickey and Nones, and consistent with the trial court's 
order of restitution at sentencing, the trial court correctly exercised jurisdiction over 
defendant to determine his remaining restitution obligation. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's order concluding that the trial court had 
jurisdiction to enforce restitution. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ! Q~^ day of J V / J L u X , 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this (O day of AAAJLA-I/ 2000,1 mailed, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to Cindy Barton-Coombs, 
193 North State Street (73-13), Roosevelt, Utah, 84066. 
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Addendum A 
STATE OF UTAH DUCHESS 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE SEP * " " 9 8 
PROTECTED J0ANNE McKEE' DEPUTY 
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT BY " 
TO: Eighth District Court - Div. I REGARDING: ALLEN, Daniel Lee 
Duchesne City, Duchesne County, Utah 
ATTN: Judge John R. Anderson CASE NO.: 961800084 
FROM: AP&P Region 4 - Provo OFFENSE: Aggravated Assault, 2nd Felony; 
Unlaw Detention and Poss. of a C/S, 
both Class B Misdemeanors 
DATE: 09/08/1998 OBSCIS: 00089015 
PROBATION DATE: 10/07/1996 ADDRESS: 1923 W 500 N, Provo, UT 84601 
LEGISLATIVE DATE: 10/06/1999 
COMMENTS: On 10/07/1996, Daniel Lee Allen was placed on probation with the following conditions: 
1. Do not use, have in your possession or under your control alcoholic beverages or 
frequent places where alcohol is the chief item of sale. 
2. Submit a letter of apology to the victim every 90 days until treatment has been 
completed. 
3. Do not use, have in your possession or under your control any non-prescribed, 
controlled substances. 
4. Serve 365 days in the Duchesne County Jail. 
5. Enter, participate in and complete an inpatient program counseling or treatment as 
directed by Adult Probation and Parole after serving 1 year in jail. 
6. Pay total restitution to the victim for any counseling and all costs in connection therein. 
The defendant has complied with our agency and completed all terms of the Probation Agreement as 
directed. Therefore, the following recommendation is being submitted to the Court 
IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY THE AGENT: NOTIFY SUPERVISOR AND COURT. 
-2 
RE: ALLEN, DANIEL LEE 
RECOMMENDATION: Adult Probation and Parole request that the defendant's probation be terminated 
satisfactorily. 
AYLOR, SUPERVISOR ^ * W I 5 SCOviiPRfifeATION OFFICER 
APPROVED AND ORDERED: J £ ~ 4 , 
DENIED: L 
DATE: to- <^)^ 
COMMENTS: 
